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Abstract
This paper explores the subjective experiences of migrants engaged in producing 
alternative modes of self-identiﬁcation and in creating a new basis for their col-
lective identity. Through the analysis of personal narratives, this article examines 
the dialectic movement between complex political and social constructions of 
Otherness and processes of self-identiﬁcation among English-educated lowland 
Burmese living in Thailand. It investigates the meanings and perceptions at-
tached to the different terms used as identity frameworks in popular discourse 
among Thai and among Burmese themselves and looks into how these terms and 
attached meanings are appropriated and acted upon in different contexts. The 
migrants involved in this research come from vastly different backgrounds and 
ideologies, but they share in common being from the Burman ethnic majority, or 
having lived and studied among Burman, and identifying themselves in terms 
of civic identity, which is reﬂected by the term 'Burmese'. Once in Thailand, 
their situation is complicated because in their everyday life they have to face the 
Thai construction of being Burmese, known as 'Pama', a term associated with 
the historical enemy in Thai nationalist discourse. The contact that educated 
Burmese have with Thai classmates or co-workers is relatively limited due to 
the general mistrust Thai people tend to have towards them. The educated 
Burmese migrants also have to confront their national Other, the members of 
minorities from the secessionist states who compose the majority of migrants 
in Thailand. In this context, their own Burmeseness, which they rarely had to 
question before they left Yangon or Mandalay, appears suddenly as it is: an 
identity deeply fragmented that needs to be captured and reappropriated. 
Key words: Burma/Myanmar, Thailand, migration, identity, feeling of belonging
Introduction
For Burmese, Thailand is like a step-mother; she will be nice to you outwardly 
but nobody knows how many times you will be pinched, squeezed or 
starved. Yin Soe, Lecturer, Bangkok1
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Adaptation to the host society is regularly presented as the ultimate goal 
or quest for migrants, sojourners or refugees. Studies on intergroup rela-
tions in the context of migration tend to emphasize patterns of exclusion 
and the need to belong or the suffering generated by a speciﬁc state of 
not belonging. Abdelmalek Sayad (2004), in his provocative essay on 
the subjective experiences of Kabyle migrants in France, writes: 
Any study of migratory phenomena that overlooks the emigrants’ conditions 
of origin is bound only to give a view that is at once partial and ethnocentric. 
On the one hand, it is only the immigrant – and not the emigrant – who is 
taken into consideration, rather as though his life began the moment he came 
to France. On the other hand, the problematic, both explicit and implicit, 
is always that of adaptation to the 'host' society. As a result, and useful as 
they may be, analyses of the immigrants' world are in danger of trapping 
themselves into two equally abstract and reductive discourses (2004: 29).
Ball and Sinha-Kerkhoff (2010: 92-93) argue that migrants have more 
'narratives of belonging at their disposal'. These narratives can be lo-
cated in the motherland and/or in the host society. According to these 
authors, the choice of belonging is shaped by the process of migration 
itself and depends partly on the political will of the host country to ac-
cept multiple narratives by allowing double citizenship. Drawing from 
Brubaker (2005), they further stress that the concept of diaspora can 
help in explaining the multiplicity of narratives of belonging but shows 
also great limitations unless it is perceived as a 'category of practices 
that allows for individual choices, needs and claims' (2005: 94) instead 
of an identity. For Eriksen (2002: 154), many minority members, which 
for him include immigrants, diaspora and refugees, participate in two 
national political systems, thus practicing what Benedict Anderson 
called long-distance nationalism (ibid; Anderson 1992). In narratives of 
belonging, the homeland is often essentialized and captured through 
a series of portraits, and feelings of belonging are sometimes confused 
with longing and suffering as a consequence of abrupt de-territoriali-
zation. Narratives also produce new understandings of homeland and 
homeness. The complex make-up of migrant communities – which is 
most of the time absent from host communities' public representations 
- together with the translocation of internal boundaries shaped by eco-
nomics, status, ethnic differences and ideologies in the home country, 
can deeply challenge the emotive construction of the homeland as 
conveyed in individual narratives. Bhikhu Parekh (2008: 39) reminds 
us that collective identity is always essentialized: 'The political struggle 
for the recognition of identity and the promotion of interests associated 
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with it generates a pressure for the unity of views and purpose, and 
encourages its essentialisation' (2008: 39). 
This essentialization in turn, is often reappropriated by the migrants 
themselves, producing new versions of their identity and alternative 
modes of internal dynamics. In the case of migrants originating from 
ethnically and ideologically divided nations, this essentialization opens 
the door for an imaginary uniﬁed home and sets the ground for reach-
ing out to the co-national Other. The politics of identity recognition 
emphasizes distinctiveness (Eriksen 2002: 143) as a key component of 
intergroup relations and sometimes as a motive for resisting assimila-
tion: distinctiveness in the host society with the potential of fostering 
new bonds among co-national immigrants. In this regard, mobility 
opens the possibility to redeﬁne oneself through alternative logics of 
belonging, even more so in cases where the nation of origin's power has 
became an intrinsic part of the popular and political imagination. New 
identity frameworks, which downplay ethnic or class divisions, are made 
operative, for example, frameworks based on shared oppression and 
victimhood. In an essay on Sierra Leone refugees and asylum seekers, 
Ferme (2004: 87) notes that the far-reaching power of the oppressive 
state shapes the everyday life of individuals far beyond the nation's 
borders. Her insights, as well as Sayad's and Bhikhu Parekh's, as I will 
demonstrate later, interestingly resonate with my own observation of 
the condition of the Burmese currently living in Thailand. 
This paper tries to capture the logics of belonging and non-belong-
ing through the subjective experiences of English-educated Burmese 
in Thailand. The ﬁrst part of this paper explores the social and political 
boundaries existing between the English-educated Burmese and their 
immediate Others, who are primarily represented by Thai nationals 
and by Burmese labour migrants and refugees from Burma's Shan 
state.2 I contend that the politics of naming and labelling is central to 
the maintenance of these boundaries, which in turn reﬂect already 
existing social hierarchies. The second part discusses the emergence of 
the feeling of oneness and solidarity among English-educated Burmese 
from different backgrounds and migration statuses. In this regard, the 
concept of victimhood, especially as it is developed in the writing of 
the French sociologist Michel Wieviorka (2005), helps to capture new 
meanings attached to Burmeseness beyond civic or ethnic modes. I also 
try to demonstrate that the feeling of not belonging is a crucial part 
of the process of adapting to a relatively hostile social environment. 
I further contend that the current immigration laws in Thailand have 
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an important role to play in fostering feelings of non-belonging among 
educated migrants, at least as much as other factors. I also argue that 
the social distance between the Burmese migrants in general and the 
Thai citizens provides great incentives to foster unity among the once 
extremely polarized Burmese, at least from the English-educated Bur-
mese perspective, once they are in Thailand. Between 2007 and 2010 
I conducted 125 interviews and collected narratives in Bangkok, Mae 
Sot and Chiang Mai. During this period, three major events deeply af-
fected the Burmese people: the Saffron Revolution of October 2007, the 
cyclone Nargis in 2008, and the announcement by the State Peace and 
Development Council (SPDC) in 2009 of the November 2010 elections. 
These events considerably shaped the way Burmeseness and relations 
with the host country were reassessed among the educated Burmese 
living in Thailand. 
According to the Irrawaddy, today at least 200 Burmese enter Thailand 
through Mae Sot every day (Irrawady, 17 January 2008).3 Currently, 2 
million Burmese, both documented and undocumented, are estimated 
to be living in Thailand (Yang 2009). The English-educated Burmese 
represent a very small percentage of this group, less than 1 per cent. 
The choice of focusing on this particular group was triggered by the 
fact that university students in Burma are perceived to be, by the cur-
rent ruling military regime, the SPDC, a constant force of potential 
contestation (Campbell 2008: 182). For the general lowland Burmese 
population, university students and former graduates hold a relatively 
high status and since the British colonial period have been popularly 
associated with the quest for political and social justice. Not surpris-
ingly, the status they have achieved back home shifts dramatically once 
they cross the border. In this sense, their case is certainly not unique, as 
migration produces new hierarchies and self-identiﬁcation frameworks. 
The control that the Burmese state continues to hold on its citizens or 
even former citizens abroad is far reaching and extremely troubling 
and, as I will try to demonstrate, the potential force of contestation they 
once represented back home is completely annihilated once they are in 
Thailand. Among these English-educated Burmese are ethnic Burman 
(Bama'r), ethnic Chinese, and members of minority groups.4 All have 
been urban dwellers at least one point during their academic life in 
Burma; most of them have lived in the former capital, Yangon (Rangoon), 
or in Mandalay, and received part of their university education in the 
English language. Once in Thailand, they study or work in places where 
they can use the English language, and generally use both Burmese and 
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English languages in their daily interactions, but almost never the Thai 
language. The narratives of their coming to Thailand vary considerably: 
some have crossed the border to study or for the purpose of work, oth-
ers have ﬂed persecution as political dissidents.5 Far from constituting 
a homogenous group, educated Burmese in Thailand represent a highly 
complex community, which includes university students, academics, 
journalists, political analysts, aid workers, engineers and artists. They 
are short- and long-term migrants, documented and undocumented; 
a signiﬁcant number of pro-democracy activists do not hold any valid 
passport. Their political views also cover a wide range of positions; 
even among pro-democracy activists drastically competing ideas and 
ideologies exist. On one hand, what these tertiary-educated Burmese 
migrants have in common is the awareness of being constructed as the 
Other in Thai popular discourse, and on the other hand, of seeing their 
own Burmeseness challenged by the overwhelming presence of Burmese 
from ethnic minority groups, such as the Shan. The Shan are viewed as 
menacing back home because they challenge the national unity. My main 
interest lies in these university students' and former students' processes 
of identiﬁcation after they have settled in Thailand. 
The Self-Identiﬁcation Process and Burmeseness
If being Burmese is already a rather complicated issue in Thailand, the 
construction of Burmeseness remains even more problematic among 
the different categories of migrants arriving every day from Burma. 
The demographic make-up of Burma is extremely complex, however 
systematically simpliﬁed by the SPDC.6 To date no proper census has 
been conducted by the current regime – or, if a census has been collected, 
it has not been made public. However, eight major ethnic groups are 
sometimes identiﬁed as follows: Bama'r or Burman (which constitute 
a 65 percent majority), Rakhine, Shan, Mon, Chin, Kayin, Kayah or 
Karenni and Kachin (Matthews 2001; Rajah 2001; Tin Maung Maung 
Than 2004; Robinne 2008; Gravers 2007). The categorization of 135 
'national races' was deﬁned by the State Law and Order Restoration 
Council (SLORC), the former name of the ruling military junta, as the 
basis for its 'Myanmarization process', in opposition to the eight-race 
categorization put forward by the British during the colonial period 
(Gravers 2007: 4). Nevertheless, Burman dominance remained an in-
trinsic part of the formation of the state despite the widely publicized 
statement that the name of Burma was changed to Myanmar precisely 
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to encompass all the 135 'national races'. According to the junta, Burma 
refers only to the ethnic Burman. Along the borders, on the other hand, 
where minority groups have formed nationalist movements empowered 
by their own armies, such as the Shan, the Mon, Karen, and the Kachin, 
the categorization of threatening secessionist groups supersedes the 
135 national race model (Kampe 1997: 4), and thus triggers the SPDC 
to engage much more drastic policy measures and interference. In this 
context, government policies have been so far essentially offensive and 
reactive, directed towards containing or cracking down on separatist 
movements. More important for this study is the fact that, for the Bur-
man majority, collective identity had been slowly de-ethnicized years 
before Ne Win and his repressive military rule began in 1962, which 
marked the beginning of political oppression in the country. 
The strong ethnic conscientization in post-colonial Burma has indeed 
led to creating the Burmese nation around the cultural, linguistic and 
political Burmanization process (Callahan 2003: 157), equating Burma-
ness with Burmeseness, thus producing a civic-focused framework that 
has always been incapable of accommodating the minority groups of 
the frontier areas. Callahan notes, 
Burmanization did not create problems for most elites, so this process was 
seen as a natural and uncontroversial step in the decolonization process. 
In the frontier areas, however, many ethnic minorities saw the situation 
differently. They did not want the country to undergo political, cultural, 
and linguistic Burmanization (Callahan 2003: 157). 
The strongly Burman-centred post-colonial government implicitly 
supported a social hierarchy through which minority languages were 
popularly deemed backward if not imminently threatening for the na-
tion-building process (Thomson 1995; see also Fink 2009).7 According 
to my own observation, this social hierarchy has continued to shape the 
self-identiﬁcation process of educated lowland Burmese, even among 
those who have settled in Thailand. A female lecturer, who had been 
living in Bangkok for 14 years, mentioned that while she was living in 
Yangon she had never been aware of using the term Bama'r in ethnic 
terms. For her, everyday language does not convey a sense of separate-
ness between being Burmese and being Burman as is the case in English. 
Being Burmese is a choice, and, as another female university lecturer 
in Bangkok put it: 'nobody wants to be associated with an oppressive 
group', in reference to the Burman. For both lecturers, using the term 
'Burman' to describe who they are does not have any appeal and they 
do not feel at ease using an identity framework that demarcates them 
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in ethnic terms. The same appears to be true for most Burmans after 
entering Thailand. It is when they arrive in Thailand that their ethnic 
make-up re-appears, largely through the daily interactions with Shan, 
Karen, and other representatives of Burmese ethnic minorities. 
Aung Naing Oo, a political analyst in exile living in Chiang Mai, ar-
gues that being Burmese is a choice that one can make whatever one's 
ethnic background. Aung Naing Oo once asked his father: 'What is my 
ethnic make-up?'8 To this question, his father explained that his father's 
great grandfather was Arkenese, an ethnic community from the northern 
part of the country. For business reasons he moved to lowland Burma 
and met a Burman woman who became his wife. Aung Naing Oo was 
even more surprised by the story of his ancestor when he learned that 
both his own father and mother were born in a Mon village in the west-
ern part of the country. He pondered the possibility that he might have 
Mon blood as well. According to him, due to socialist rule and Ne Win's 
strong focus on national identity, most Burman were not conscious of 
their speciﬁc ethnic make-up. It is only in the wake of the 1988 uprising 
that the quest for identity consciously arose, prompting many to choose 
to describe themselves as Burmese ﬁrst while recognizing their ethnic 
make-up, even when born from mixed ethnic parentage. 
Localizing their ethnic make-up is an act of high relevance for politi-
cal thinkers and activists because it helps to exemplify the multi-ethnic 
and encompassing character of the democratization project. As for Aung 
Naing Oo, he made this conscious choice during the uprising of 1988, 
and that choice reﬂects opting for the nation beyond any alternative 
mode of identiﬁcation. In this context, recognizing that ethnicity is 'not 
in the blood', but is indeed constructed, becomes an extremely important 
part of the process of self-identiﬁcation for many Burmese who would 
ofﬁcially be identiﬁed as Burman by the Burmese administration. In 
a similar move, educated Burmese who once felt a stronger afﬁliation 
to their ethnic background also make the choice to identify primarily 
with the larger community of Burmese in time of collective crisis with-
out necessarily forgetting their own ethnic identity. Not surprisingly, 
the Saffron Revolution was a powerful trigger, as was the case with a 
Burmese student of Chinese descent who was already living in Chiang 
Mai when the tragic event took place in the streets of Yangon: 
In Yangon, I never questioned who I was. I saw myself as Chinese; it was 
really clear to me. However, when I watched on TV Burmese military 
shooting on monks during the Saffron Revolution, I became extremely angry 
and hopeless. I suddenly felt a lot of solidarity with other Burmese and started 
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seeing myself as Burmese instead of Chinese. I also started feeling strongly 
about the bad treatment Burmese get in Thailand. I looked at my passport 
and became conscious of being from Myanmar, of being Burmese.9
Another student, an ethnic Mon woman studying in a Bangkok 
university, explained that when she ﬁrst moved from the Mon state to 
Yangon to pursue undergraduate studies, she saw herself as quite dif-
ferent from the other students:
The ﬁrst year was quite challenging. Other students were looking at me as 
someone from a minority group. However, over time, I started identifying 
myself more in terms of being Burmese and less as a Mon. This is not that I 
was trying to hide my Mon identity, but just that at the university, everybody 
is Burmese, and nobody thinks themselves as coming from minority groups. 
I think it has more to do with living in Yangon. In the city, people tend 
to see themselves differently. So yes, I can say I am Burmese. Only a few 
months after I arrived in Bangkok, I witnessed the Saffron Revolution on 
television. I saw monks being shot by the military; I also felt very Burmese, 
even if I am Christian. It does not matter to which ethnic group or religion 
we belong, when Burmese are tortured and killed, we know that it can also 
happen to any of us.
The Politics of Naming
In the English language, the difference between ethnic and national 
identity is made clear. The ethnic majority in current Burma is referred 
to as Burman while the civic identity is referred to by the terms 'Burmese' 
or 'Myanmarese'. This distinction, however, does not exist as such in 
the Burmese language. The awareness of equating Burmeseness with 
Burmaness is not so obvious among the educated Burmese because 
thinking in terms of ethnic identity is deﬁnitely not part of the every-
day interaction among Yangon's tertiary-educated people. Therefore, 
when the Burmese speak in English, it is possible for them to assert 
relatively clearly how they want to be identiﬁed. This is not so much 
the case in the Burmese language, and how they want to be identiﬁed 
will be interpreted differently according to the speciﬁc context. The use 
of the term 'Bamar' is more frowned upon by the younger generation 
of educated Burman who now favour the term 'Myanmar', which is 
believed to encompass all ethnic groups. Most, if not all, tertiary-edu-
cated Burmese now in Thailand have spent some years at one point or 
another in Yangon or Mandalay, to pursue a university degree before 
leaving. Yangon and Mandalay, the major cities of lowland Burma, are 
still today considered the centre of power (Mya Maung 1990: 611) and 
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of high education. However, Burman represents mainly the distinc-
tive majority group that has led the country since independence and 
has limited its own access to power (ibid). On the other hand, the term 
Burma has become an obvious political statement on the international 
platform. The choice of using Burma or Myanmar at the diplomatic 
level pertains directly to the recognition (or lack of recognition) of the 
ruling SPDC, who in turn refused to hand over power to Daw Aung San 
Suu Kyi and the Liberal Democratic Party after their landslide election 
victory in 1990. 
On a more personal level, the boundary between the two is blurred 
by the fact that in the Burmese language, the terms only constitute 
two pronunciation and written variants of the same word and both 
refer to the ethnic majority. For many students I encountered, the less 
problematic term is 'Myanmar': 'I come from a country now called My-
anmar, I am Myanmar', exclaimed a post-graduate student in Chiang 
Mai. Her statement represents well in my view the distinction made 
by the younger generation of the tertiary-educated Burmese who do 
not want to be deﬁned through their ethnic background. For this stu-
dent, as for others, the English term 'Burmese' is problematic as it also 
means the Bama'r majority: Burman, a term well known among the 
older generation of political exiles is not popular among the younger, 
educated migrants. Some of the older generation of pro-democracy 
activists, see in this labelling a systematic political stance. This is in my 
view a perspective built up in the pro-democracy language of interna-
tional Burmese support groups; many educated youth, mostly, if not 
all from relatively privileged economic backgrounds, come to Thailand 
without any deﬁned political views or even interest in understanding 
democratization processes. Their knowledge of what is happening in 
their country is one-sided and thus, limited due to extreme censorship 
and lack of access to foreign news. What they should call themselves is 
not questioned until they arrive in Thailand. 
For the general Thai public, Burmese images correspond to one 
category of migrants, the 'Pama', whose members share more or less 
common characteristics, many of which are unabatedly derogative. 
In everyday life as well as in the public discourse, the complex ethnic 
make-up of what constitutes being Burmese is generally not addressed. 
Only in the northern part of Thailand, where a solidarity movement 
in support of the ethnic Shan has became stronger over the years, 
a distinction between Burmese in general and Tai Yai, the popular 
name given to the Tai-speaking ethnic groups of the Shan state, will 
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sometimes be emphasized. Nevertheless, anyone acquainted with the 
Thai public portrayal of minorities will know that the politics of differ-
entiating the Shan from other Burmese nationals is mainly a question 
of rhetoric. In practice, discrimination is as strong for the Shan as it is 
for other Burmese migrants, although the form it takes is based less on 
historical enmity and more on social status. In general, 'Pama', for the 
average Thai citizen, refers to anyone coming from Burma/Myanmar, 
without regard for the ethnicity or region of origin. The name 'Pama' 
is a deformation of Bama'r and captures, in popular discourse, both 
the unskilled labour migrants and the brutal historical enemy who 
invaded and captured Ayutthaya in the eighteenth century. The term 
is highly pejorative and triggers feelings of fear and mistrust. Bur-
mese migrants are regularly portrayed as transgressors and threats to 
Thailand national security by both Thai state agencies and the media 
(Grundy-Warr and Wong 2002: 95). 'As soon as I mention that I am 
Burmese, people stop talking to me', noted a male graduate student 
living in Chiang Mai. Burmese migrants are regularly the target of 
robbery, taxi overpricing and police-bribery practices. Police ofﬁcers 
who indulge in bribery have no problem justifying their actions along 
the well-known lines of 'avenging their forefathers'. From their school 
years on, Thai citizens learn to dislike and mistrust the Burmese with 
an unchallenged nationalistic passion. Feelings of mistrust are deeply 
rooted and rarely challenged or thought over. In Search of Sunlight, 
a published series of narratives collected among Burmese grassroot 
migrants in Thailand, powerfully echoes these acts of systematic dis-
crimination and even hatred routinely faced by the dislocated indi-
viduals. According to the editor of the collection, the Burmese suffer 
prejudices to a much greater extent in comparison to Cambodian or 
Laotian migrants: 
Since the onset of the economic crisis in Thailand in mid-1997, migrant 
workers have become scapegoats, accused of stealing jobs from the local 
people and of being the cause of unemployment for two million Thai 
citizens. Moreover, nationalist propaganda promoting the patriotic notion 
of 'loving only one's own nation and undermining the others', has made 
these people from Burma a 'threat to national security' in the eyes of many 
Thais. Such displaced people from Burma are indiscriminately branded as 
thieves, murderers, rapists, drug trafﬁckers, and prostitutes and blamed for 
spreading infectious diseases. Furthermore, the Thais who help or support 
'the Burmese' are also labeled as those who do not love their own country 
(Pim Koetsawang 2001: 22).
The author also mentioned that migrant labour workers suffer dis-
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crimination more deeply compared to the political asylum seekers. This 
statement, however, can be contested, as in the following case: Myint 
Htun (not his real name), a former journalist and student deeply in-
volved in opposition movements, escaped the military and crossed the 
border illegally after four years hiding in the countryside. In Thailand 
he reached Chiang Mai ﬁrst and applied for a scholarship for Burmese 
exiles and moved to Bangkok to join one of the most reputable universi-
ties of the country and study political science. There all his friends were 
other Burmese and Westerners. Although the courses were in English, 
Thai students would rarely engage with him, and when they did, it was 
always formally, as they would do with all other Burmese students. It 
was even more difﬁcult to understand because part of the program was 
concerned with human rights issues and many Thai students were hop-
ing to ﬁnd a job in human rights advocacy organizations. According to 
Myint Htun, he would never shy away from talking to his classmates 
about his own experiences. After completing his undergraduate studies 
he moved back to the border area and found a job with an international 
organization assisting the relocation of refugees in a third country. His 
experience with Thai non-governmental organization (NGO) workers 
was not much better: 
I feel discriminated against all the time by my Thai co-workers. They look 
down on me and keep the interactions to the minimum. Their attitude is 
completely different with Americans and Europeans however. These NGOs 
are supposed to be there to help and support the Burmese people, but they 
still look down on Burmese co-workers. 
This example is by no means unique. Embracing the 'democracy cause' 
and human rights as a social movement and form of identity does not 
erase the contradiction of supporting, on the one hand, international 
movements and NGO practices promoted in the West, and on the other 
hand, continuing to maintain, at the personal level, deep-rooted feelings 
of mistrust and condescension. 
The Reactive Other: Minorities from the Border States
In 2004, Ab Carabao, a Thai folk singer extremely popular among the 
Thai rural poor, produced an album called Mai Tong Rong Hai (Don't 
cry), entirely dedicated to the plea and suffering of the Tai Yai from the 
secessionist Shan state. From tunes originally written by Bob Marley he 
rewrote lyrics reminding his Thai followers that the Shan insurgency, 
to which he became a strong advocate, should be understood in the 
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context of the historical brutality of the Burmese (Pama) towards the 
peace-loving Thai. By pointing out to the Thai that the Tai Yai have 
been victims of the Burmese and are 'blood brothers', the underlying 
script of the songs reinforces the powerful stereotype of the Burmese 
as enemies of the Thai. In its April 2006 issue, the Irrawaddy examined 
the popular image of the Shan insurgency commander as conveyed by 
the media and artists such as Ab Carabao and noted:
 What emerges in the various media portraits of Yawd Serk and the Shan 
independence movement is an effort to cast them as long-lost Thai brethren, 
whose struggles against an oppressive regime have historical parallels 
to Thailand's past conﬂicts with Burma – and, therefore, should inspire 
sympathy for their cause.
Two frameworks are at play. One is being Burmese - the historical 
Other in Thai nationalist discourse - the history schoolbook villains who 
invaded the heavenly capital of Ayutthaya. The second is being associ-
ated with Tai Yai, modern-day illegal migrants, a category represented 
as 'transgressors and threats by state agencies and the media' (Grundy-
Warr and Wong 2002: 95) in Thailand and as violent separatists in Burma. 
Tai Yai women are often constructed as praiseworthy domestic workers: 
'they are like us', maintained a Thai female university professor from 
Chiang Mai respectfully, 'We (the Thai) can trust them in our home; 
they are not real Burmese; they are trustworthy and compassionate'. 
This depiction of Shan Tai Yai women draws the boundaries with the 
'Other' in historical and linguistic terms, leaving other Burmese migrants 
alienated as much from a large section of their co-nationals as from the 
Thai nationals. In Plastic Nation, Pavin Chachavalpongpun remarks:
Up until 1988, the Thai governments, with the backing of the military, 
invented and reinvented Burma as the personiﬁcation of the historical enemy. 
In the meantime, Thai elites transformed the Shans, known as Tai Yai (big 
Tai), and other border minorities into part of a greater Thai family to glorify 
the notion of Thainess. The extension of the Thai ethno-family offered the 
title of historical friends to those ethnic minorities (2005: 59).
For the Shan migrants who have escaped the brutality of the Burmese 
military, the contact with Burman exiles remains difﬁcult, coloured 
with distrust and even hatred. For the Burman activists in exile on the 
other hand, the failure of their movements in fostering changes in their 
homeland, and even the brutal crackdown on monks and civilians dur-
ing the 2007 Saffron Revolution, have already been linked to the lack of 
involvement of the national minorities of border states (see for example 
the Irrawaddy, November 2007). Displaced Shan minorities have the 
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potential to develop a sense of belonging to Thailand once they cross 
the border due to shared language and traditions. The degree of lack of 
solidarity between the border state minorities and Burmese lowlanders 
is reﬂected partly in the type of relations that take place on the other side 
of the border. Predictable as it sounds, other forces are at play as the 
structure of power relations shifts dramatically in Thailand, generating 
new experiences and new subjectivities. When they land on Thai soil for 
the ﬁrst time, educated lowland Burmese understand ethnic dynamics 
in terms of rhetoric only and therefore, becoming suddenly aware of the 
increasingly large number of Burmese coming from the border state is 
quite shocking. The term Tai Yai, however, is not still popularly used 
among Thai people except to a certain degree in Chiang Mai and Mae 
Hong Son. The term 'Pama' remains in any case the all-encompassing 
category that imperatively collapses the divided identity that prevails 
inside Burma, as exempliﬁed by a male engineering student from Yan-
gon: 'When I arrived in Chiang Mai, I was so surprised to see so many 
Burmese living and working here. I was even more shocked to realize 
that the people we call Thai in Myanmar are called Burmese here'. 
The awareness of a reactive Other greatly complicates any of the po-
litical aims educated Burmese, especially members of pro-democracy 
movements, might hold. The lack of unity among different opposition 
groups as well as among ethnic groups has often been pointed out as 
a major impediment to successful democratization movements. In the 
news media of the exiled Burmese, such as the Irrawaddy in Chiang Mai 
and the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) in Norway, journalists and 
political commentators take up the issue on a regular basis with thought-
provoking analysis. However, most of my respondents mentioned that 
until they moved to Thailand they had had no real knowledge of the 
meaning of 'unity' because they had never directly experienced the 
labelling of belonging to an ethnic or distinct political collective (apart 
from being against the junta) with such pronounced boundaries. 
Framing Otherness
Many scholars have addressed the issue of Burmese negative repre-
sentation in Thailand from the perspective of nationalist discourse. 
The construction of Khwampenthai, commonly translated as Thainess, 
rooted in the late 1930s, began an era of staunch nationalism with Prime 
Minister Phibun Songkhram. Phibun has already been widely discussed 
as the source of the widespread acknowledgement of negative feel-
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ings towards the Burmese, thanks mostly to the writings of Tongchai 
Winichakul and Pavin Chachavalpongpun. In Thailand, the Burmese 
collective identity has attained such an acute level of essentialization 
that just the naming of the group, regardless of ethnicity, class, educa-
tion level, purpose or status of migration, takes us back to a limited 
series of criteria and historical references, which all point to fear and 
mistrust, and thus, by consequence, to the imperative need to maintain 
solid boundaries between the 'us' and 'them'. A third-year engineering 
student in Chiang Mai remarks:
One of my professors explained to us that Thai people learn to hate the 
Burmese through the history they learned. How come we do not learn to hate 
British and the Japanese who invaded and colonized us? We also learn our 
history in school. There must be other reasons why the Thai do not like us. 
Thongchai Winichakul refers to 'negative identiﬁcation' as a process 
through which Thai citizens learn from school age to deﬁne themselves 
by identifying what is 'un-Thai'. According to him, an example of nega-
tive identiﬁcation can easily be found in everyday life (1994: 5). On the 
'essence' of Thainess, or Khwampenthai, Winichakul writes:
In Thailand today there is a widespread assumption that there is such a 
thing as a common Thai nature or identity: khwanpenthai (Thainess). It is 
believed to have existed for a long time, and all Thai are supposed to be 
well aware of its virtue. The essence of Thainess has been well preserved up 
to the present time despite the fact that Siam has been transformed greatly 
toward modernization in the past hundred years (1994: 3).
The concept of negative identiﬁcation was pushed further a few years 
later by Pavin Chachavalpongpun, in his discussion about Khwampenthai, 
or Thainess, which is, according to him, determined through the con-
struction of evil others, which are represented by the farang (Westerners) 
and the Burmese. He argues that, '…because the prime objective of the 
negative identiﬁcation was to identify Thainess, it would not matter 
whether otherness could be clearly deﬁned, as long as it served as a 
contradictory subject to Thai nationhood' (2005: 41). 
He further demonstrates with great detail that the production of civic 
nationalistic feelings through the construction of the Burmese villain 
'Other' was an effective strategy used by King Chulalongkorn and later 
by the ﬁrst prime minister, Phibun, to demonstrate the unwillingness 
of the Thai to forget their traditional enemy (Chachavalpongpun 2005: 
51). Popular ﬁlms, drama series and novels constantly replay the myth 
of the historically brutal enemy embodied by the Burmese and the 
destruction of Ayutthaya in 1767. The myth of the untrustworthy and 
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violent Burmese continues to shape the perception of the Thai towards 
the migrants from Burma even though, in fact, conﬂicts with the Burmese 
were noteworthy in only three periods over the 400 years of Ayutthaya's 
history (Peleggi 2007: 194). 
Without discarding the value of Tongchai Winichakul and Pavin 
Chachavalpongpun's insights, I would like to frame the issue in another 
conceptual framework, one that takes patterns of discrimination as 
an unavoidable consequence of any nationalist performance and thus 
moves forward from a nationalistic construction to provide another 
perspective, one emerging from the subjective experiences of the mar-
ginalized. Appadurai reminds us:
No modern nations, however benign [their] political system and however 
eloquent [their] public voices may be about the virtues of tolerance, 
multiculturalism, and inclusion, are free of the idea that its national 
sovereignty is built on some sort of ethnic genius (2006: 3).
Appadurai's view might at ﬁrst appear as shockingly straightforward, 
but his view does indeed strike a chord and incites us to stop relativ-
izing up to the extent that the operativity of state construction becomes 
blurred and unaccountable. Drawing from Giddens, Ortner (2006: 111) 
remarks that actors are always at least partially 'knowing subjects', 
interacting constantly with their environment from the position of the 
subject, deeply feeling the discrepancy between their imagined collec-
tive and the gap between this imagined collective and the unavoidably 
fragmented image presented to them by others. As the host nation of 
reference here, we cannot ignore the fact that Thailand has behind it 
a long history of cultivating feelings of hostility and distrust towards 
Burman and Burmese people in general. However, strict immigration 
policies towards refugees and asylum seekers, as I will discuss later, add 
quite a dramatic touch to the picture, silencing the voices of people who 
crossed the border, in some cases with the hope of being heard. 
According to Appadurai, minority groups are both necessary and 
unwelcome for the majority (Appadurai 2006: 44). They are desirable 
because they can ﬁt into a category where they can be useful for the 
majority, for example, as Burmese domestic helpers and caretakers in 
Bangkok and Chiang Mai. Unskilled labour migrants, who are the ma-
jority of people from the Shan state, are known to make an extremely 
positive contribution to the Thai economy, and this seems to be well 
acknowledged by the Thai public despite the severe discrimination 
they are suffering on a daily basis (Yang 2009). They are unwelcome 
because the boundaries of the minority groups' identities are not so 
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clearly demarcated, which makes them somehow threatening. This is 
especially the case with educated migrants, who are difﬁcult to locate 
in the social hierarchy and whose loyalty and contributions cannot be 
captured as easily. In that sense, they do ﬁt even more the public image 
of the historical enemy, a rather convenient representation that serves 
as a justiﬁcation for feelings of mistrust and even disgust. The feeling 
of being systematically looked down upon, of being made responsible 
for their own political fate, of being considered as enemies and as un-
trustworthy is acute among the English-educated Burmese. 
This boundary is not only one-sided, but also appears almost as 
strongly among the lowland Burmese migrants' perspective even though 
the education system in Burma has always targeted the British as the 
evil other, and not the Thai neighbours. According to their narratives, 
the awareness of not being welcome in Thailand is fairly strong among 
the educated Burmese migrants. The refusal to belong is often reaf-
ﬁrmed through the repetitive assertion of being temporary sojourners 
who should stay as far away as possible from any process that would 
potentially take them a little closer to being Thai. This does not mean, 
however, that the possibility of seeing Thailand as their permanent home 
is totally shunned – it is possible to live in Thailand without becoming 
Thai. However, gaining citizenship would put them suddenly at the 
bottom of the social, political and economic hierarchy in a formal way. 
Stereotypes about Thai nationals are also quite enduring. The most 
common case mentioned among my respondents is the lack of under-
standing of Buddhism and immoral, non-religious behaviours, of being 
too centred on themselves and condescending towards people from 
the neighbouring countries. On the positive side, the Thai people are 
described as politically vocal and assertive towards their own leaders.
Not Belonging
Thai citizenship for the Burmese migrants is better than being stateless, 
as long as the Thai government does not require them to assimilate and 
forget their own language, culture and political ambitions towards their 
motherland. However, citizenship is rarely an option due to stringent 
conditions that can rarely be met by Burmese migrants, so educated 
Burmese who cannot – or do not want to – go back to their homeland 
in its current political state see Thailand merely as a stepping stone to 
a third country or as a temporary shelter. This distinction is triggered 
by the series of factors listed earlier. And in fact, this distinction helps 
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to construct a marginal status in a sort of comfort zone in which the re-
fusal to belong is an intrinsic part of this distinction, reminiscent of the 
exiles' rejection of belonging evoked by Said in his thought-provoking 
'Reﬂections on Exile':
No matter how well they may do, exiles are always eccentrics who feel 
their difference (even as they frequently exploit it) as a kind of orphanhood. 
Anyone who is really homeless regards the habit of seeing estrangement in 
everything modern as an affectation, a display of modish attitudes. Clutching 
difference like a weapon to be used with stiffened will, the exile jealously 
insists on his or her right to refuse to belong (2000:182).
Unwillingness to belong to the host state is pervasive among all the 
Burmese I encountered during three years of ﬁeldwork in Thailand, 
and this unwillingness is not only restricted to Burmese who identi-
ﬁed themselves as exiles. However, a good proportion of documented 
graduate students and scholars have more in common with the exiles 
than with their friends and family who never left Burma. Their aware-
ness grows as they live in Thailand and interact with pro-democracy 
political exiles and access the mountain of information available through 
English-speaking news networks about the political situation back home. 
The difference is their constant fear of effectively being forced into exile 
and thus not being able one day to return safely to visit their families 
and friends. On the other hand, the undocumented exiles are often ter-
riﬁed by the idea of being sent back. In other words, the documented 
migrants are afraid of having to share the destiny of their co-nationals 
in exile; however, every important crisis back home is a moment of 
collective anxiety and suffering through which the boundary between 
the legal and illegal migrants almost disappears. Thailand, as a nation-
state, will never be their 'true' home and there is not much will among 
the educated Burmese migrants to make the effort of integrating into 
Thai society. However, it would be misleading to simply assert that the 
desire not to belong to the Thai Kingdom is a matter of fact for the ma-
jority of Burmese migrants. As I will try to demonstrate later, the Thai 
state, through evasive immigration laws and illusive practices by law 
enforcement ofﬁcers has help producing a meta-narrative that conveys 
the feeling of not belonging. 
 Subjective experiences therefore shed light on processes that remain 
completely absent of statistics and demographics. Among these proc-
esses are the ones that lead to the refusal to belong in any other way 
than to occupy temporarily, but at the same time entirely, a space: a 
neighbourhood, a town, a university faculty. It does not mean, however, 
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that the attachment to the location is superﬁcial: the community that 
has been created, the network, and even the cafes that have been over 
the years monopolized by Burmese students and the intellectual elite 
in exile, the established Burmese eateries, on campus or few kilometres 
away, are all places where deep, homey feelings are anchored. Moe Ye 
Htay (not her real name), a writer in exile since 1996 who has applied 
for immigration in the US, describes this anchorage through her own 
experience of belonging and non-belonging:
Chiang Mai is my home; it is where I live, where I am happy. I have been 
here for almost 20 years and I cannot even imagine myself going back to 
live in Burma. I do not feel however that Thailand is my home because I do 
not have any legal papers and I will never get them from here; Thailand has 
never really wanted me. They tolerate me as long as I stay polite and silent. 
My real home is my community, my friends, my students... I am really afraid 
of leaving, going to the US. Even if I have many friends there, I want to go 
only to get a passport, so I can come back to Chiang Mai and not be afraid 
anymore of being deported to Burma. 
The subjective experiences of Burmese migrants include, in great 
part, the process of reassessing their own identity frames of reference. 
It is especially the case for the Burmese students, a community which 
includes civil servants sent by the SPDC, individuals who receive schol-
arships from various organizations including overseas pro-democracy 
organizations or local Thai universities. The scripts university-educated 
Burmese are unfolding should be read partly as modes of resistance to-
wards being incorporated into the social hierarchy popularly expressed 
in Thai media and public discourse. However, being associated with 
an oppressive majority, the Burman, is a script to which most tend to 
resist, even more when they are in contact with the oppressed minori-
ties from their homeland. In this context, to be called 'Pama' seems to 
be less problematic since the negative stereotypes the term is associ-
ated with in Thailand do not refer to the Burmese military regime, 
but allude essentially to the Thai social hierarchy. Even more, 'Pama' 
includes everyone from Burma without drawing boundaries between 
ethnic groups. In this sense, it shares some similarities with 'Burmese'. 
The ambivalence towards accepting or rejecting this Thai construction 
of Burmeseness does not indicate, however, that this construction is 
honoured, but rather, that it is public and relatively well deﬁned, and 
therefore easier to appropriate and act upon. However, the stereotype 
of being associated with unskilled workers and domestic helpers is of-
ten a matter of debate among the educated Burmese migrants: 'I object 
to being called Pama', indicated a female lecturer in Bangkok during a 
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focus group. 'Pama means ''maid'' for the Thai, and I do not like to be 
identiﬁed as such', she continued. A female student and pro-democracy 
activist, present at the same focus group, disagreed: 'For me, I have no 
objection to being called Pama. When Thai people ask me where I am 
from, I tell them I am Pama. However, I also always add, I am a student 
from (…) University'. 
For Abdelmalek Sayad, the equation between migrants and OS 
(Ouvrier spécialisé – literally, specialized worker, but better translated 
as unskilled worker) is obvious in the case of the Kabyle in France (2004: 
162). Among the Burmese in Thailand, this equation has also found 
strong resonance and educated migrants feel challenged to the core:
Every time I say that I am Burmese, people think that I am a domestic worker, 
Pama or Bama'r signiﬁes 'maid' in the mind of the Thai people. Nobody will 
ask what I do, they assume all the time that I am there to do their housework. 
Even at the meditation centre of Sri Chimnoy, a woman told me, after few 
days of meditation: 'Would you like to clean at my house?' I was so insulted, 
although she knew very well that Sri Chimnoy, the greatest meditation 
master, was Burmese!
At a point in the narration of their experience, all my respondents 
would refer to a situation of isolation, stigmatization, mistrust and 
ostracism from their Thai classmates and co-workers. All of them, as 
other Burmese short-term or long-term migrants, sojourners and refu-
gees, are to a large extent left with no other choices but to incorporate 
these representations in the framing of their daily interaction with 
Thai people. The negative representations also affect deeply the way 
they themselves construct their own space and trigger feelings of not 
belonging. However, in everyday life, many of my respondents try to 
strategically avoid facing prejudices by hiding their national identity. In 
this context, a female NGO staff member mentions, 'When a taxi driver 
asks me where I am from, I do not say I am Burmese. Usually, I simply 
do not answer, or if he insists I will say I am from the Philippines.'
As for any migrant, individual experiences of the collective for the 
Burmese in Thailand are lived simultaneously in two separate worlds 
representing two locations that can likely be called home: the rejection 
of Thailand as a home does not mean that the town or the city of resi-
dence cannot be considered as such. The 'home' in this case is contained 
in a number of streets, a neighbourhood with its Burmese coffee shops 
and food stalls, as is the case in Chiang Mai and Bangkok, or a whole 
town such as Mae Sot. In constructing their identity the migrants and 
sojourners move between power structures and between images of 
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themselves constructed through these same structures. This dialectic 
is especially noticeable between the images of victim, which shape 
Burmeseness in transnational solidarity movements and as historical 
villain, which continues to dominate in Thai popular discourse. On 27 
September 2007, The Nation's editorial 'Cut all support to evil regime' 
pleads for more humanitarian assistance to Burmese refugees ﬂeeing 
the violent crackdown following the Saffron Revolution. In response, a 
Burmese scientist living in the outskirts of Bangkok begins her letter as 
follows: 'Firstly of all I would like to plead to the editors of The Nation 
and also Thai citizens, please don't prepare to welcome the refugees. 
Just help us to be able to go home'.10 The writer never sent the letter for 
fear of reprisal, afraid even to use a pseudonym. As is the case with 
many Burmese academic professionals and students living in Thailand, 
she never actively engaged in political activities, choosing to suffer in 
silence because of the real fear of putting her family back in Yangon in 
danger, being arrested herself when she goes on her bi-yearly visits, or 
being expelled from Thailand.11 Fear and mistrust are profound, being 
part of the experience of most, if not all, Burmese living in Thailand, 
whatever their political stance. 
Victimhood: Reaching Out to the National Other
After the cyclone Nargis devastated the lowland regions of Burma, 
killing more than 140,000 people, a fairly large number of students and 
other educated Burmese living in Chiang Mai and Bangkok got involved 
in support groups to help the victims of the cyclone and collect dona-
tions. As such activities were highly controlled and monopolized by 
the Burmese government, many Burmese volunteers in Thailand faced 
the danger of being repatriated. They had to operate in the dark, with 
very few resources but networks and contacts inside their homeland, to 
whom they would channel money and goods. In many instances they 
had to hide their activities from their own employer or university for 
fear of reprisal, unless they would agree to channel the funding through 
ofﬁcial, but very unreliable channels. During the Saffron Revolution of 
2007, very few students went to demonstrate against the brutality of the 
Burmese junta. In addition, pro-democracy students in Bangkok went 
into hiding in Chiang Mai and Mae Sot. Other students were brave 
enough to demonstrate in front of the Burmese Embassy; however, they 
had to hide their faces in front of cameras for fear of being recognized 
by their own teachers or untrustworthy classmates. 
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In Burma, the SPDC uses various means to extend its power outside 
its borders, including making those who are left behind responsible for 
their kins' political activities abroad. Naturalization is not an option for 
most migrants and newcomers in Thailand, and thus, the right to equal-
ity is impossible. For the educated Burmese in Thailand, integration is 
also not an issue, at least not a priority, or even a desire. The right to 
have a voice without having to belong sounds a priori contradictory, 
however, this right is ultimately the only one that could truly make 
sense to a large proportion of educated Burmese in Thailand. In these 
periods of tremendous insecurity, patterns of division and diverging 
views emerge together with a new frame of identiﬁcation, which implies 
collective suffering and victimhood. The victim signiﬁes, according to 
Wieviorka, the public recognition of the suffering lived by a person or 
a group (2005: 100), thus inferring the subjectiﬁcation of the collective. 
The victim deﬁnes herself or himself through that which she or he was 
deprived, through suffering and loss (2005: 104). It is through their 
personal narrative that victims ﬁnd a voice. For the pro-democracy 
activist Burmese, most of whom are considered ethnic Burman, loss 
represents deprivation of individual freedom and is constructed on the 
basis of human rights principles, while for the Shan, this deprivation 
is translated primarily in terms of the infringement of collective rights 
based on ethnicity and indigeneity. Michel Wieviorka argued that the 
victims who express themselves through collective identity – which he 
refers to as victimes collectives (collective victims) - have not necessarily 
been touched personally by mass massacres and other barbarian acts, 
but are deeply affected because they belong to a group, a community 
that has been, at any point of time, the object of acts of extreme violence 
that have completely destroyed their own historical markers (repères), 
culture and daily life (2005: 91). The emergence of the victim signiﬁes, 
according to Wieviorka, the public recognition of the suffering lived by 
a person or a group (2005: 100). He contends that victimhood proves to 
be a powerful mode of identiﬁcation through which individuals express 
their grievance on an international platform while reclaiming the status 
of subject, which violence has dramatically taken away from them. 
 Violence does not imply only physical violence. Structural violence, 
which is mainly translated by poverty, disempowerment, emotional 
violence and silencing, affects virtually all aspects of human life. The 
collective identity of 'victim' is speciﬁcally suitable for the pro-democ-
racy Burmese who largely design their political aspirations in terms of 
national unity implying that 'we ultimately all suffer the same fate, at 
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the mercy of the same brutal government'. The reorganization of the 
self for the educated Burmese in Thailand has to include the processing 
of images of collective suffering, especially the images referring to key 
events and uprisings which have each time incited a large number of 
people seeking refuge in Thailand. References to structural violence back 
home notably occupy a place next to the violent crackdowns of 8-8-88 
and the 2007 Saffron Revolution and open the possibility for victims to 
join the community of victims. For the documented students I met, the 
drive to identify as a victim can be extremely powerful to the point of 
shaping everyday interactions. In this context, victimhood helps them 
to be recognized as acting subjects; they are duly aware that the shar-
ing and appropriation of narratives of collective suffering are effective 
ways, on one hand, to foster a sense of belonging to a cause, which they 
come to see as theirs, and on the other hand, to trigger respect among 
the Thai and other non-Burmese in their immediate surroundings. 
The politics of immigration in Thailand has helped to produce this 
new form of identiﬁcation through notoriously ambiguous legislation. 
Thailand has not signed the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees or its 1967 Protocol, therefore all persons entering the King-
dom without permission are considered illegal migrants (Huguet and 
Punpuing 2005; Rajah 2001). Thailand, according to the Documentation 
for Action Groups in Asia (DAGA), applies a very narrow deﬁnition 
of refugees 'as persons ﬂeeing armed conﬂict rather than abiding by 
the broader and internationally accepted deﬁnition of persecution in 
their home country' (DAGA 2005: 19). Under these conditions, asylum 
seekers and illegal labour migrants are equally under the threat of be-
ing deported at any time unless they apply to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to be recognized as 'persons of 
concern' and therefore eligible to be relocated in a third country. For this 
condition to apply, however, they must resettle in one of the 'temporary 
displaced persons' camps located at the border with Burma and wait 
for their fate to be decided. Many people have already spent years in 
these camps in extremely precarious conditions. However, in 1999, after 
radical demonstrations in front of the UNHCR by student resettlement 
seekers, the Thai government subsequently closed the Maneeloy camp, 
the only refugee camp for students and political activists. With the clos-
ing of the Maneeloy camp, the tertiary educated who ﬂee the country 
because of fear of persecution have been stripped of the only protec-
tion they had of not being sent back to Burma.12 The camp was kept in 
miserable conditions and the students suffered constant harassment 
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from the camp authorities, the police and the residents of Ratchaburi, 
the town where the camp was located. Some political dissidents have 
condemned the radical movements led by the student refugees, arguing 
that the standoff has eroded the reputation of the asylum seekers and 
created mistrust among the Thai. 
The ambivalence of the immigration laws and the constant fear of 
being deported create a social climate that is absolutely not conducive 
for dialogue and openness, thus preventing Burmese migrants from 
engaging in open discussion that could potentially lead to a better un-
derstanding of their condition among the Thai public. This is accentuated 
by the common belief that institutions attended by large numbers of 
Burmese are inﬁltrated by spies or simply righteous SPDC supporters. 
Victimhood is strengthened by that permanent state of insecurity and 
mistrust in an environment devoid of any legal protection. 
Conclusion
In this paper I have examined a set of perspectives on identity and feel-
ings of belonging among educated Burmese who have been living in 
Thailand. As I tried to demonstrate, educated Burmese migrants come 
from vastly different backgrounds and ideologies. They are not a uniﬁed 
community, but nevertheless do have greater opportunities to get to 
know and learn from each other compared to the limited opportunities 
they have in practice to do the same with Thai co-workers or classmates. 
In Thailand, Burmese migrants are confronted with different models 
of self-identiﬁcation: the model that has shaped them from their child-
hood to the university years, the model deﬁned by the Thai state and 
popular discourse, and the one that is continuously produced through 
their daily experiences in Thailand. 
The feeling of belonging among migrants has in my view much to do 
with the liberty to choose an environment where self-identity processes 
are in line with the identity frameworks proposed in the land of adop-
tion and where the dialectic between self and other does not appear as 
a challenge in everyday life. In Thailand, Otherness has been created 
through the state apparatus with the aim of instigating feelings of be-
longing among its own citizens, not only towards the state, but towards 
the nation, the speciﬁc central Thai culture, and a speciﬁc language and 
religion. All of these elements have been politically and socially embod-
ied in the concept of Thainess or Kwampenthai. The Other in Thailand is 
thus constructed as originating from outside the boundaries of the state, 
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and it is speciﬁcally the incursion of this Other inside the Thai territory 
that is considered threatening for many Thai. In this context, minorities 
in Thailand tend to be perceived as temporary migrants, even if their 
history has been unfolding inside the geographical boundaries of the 
country for generations. In Burma, on the other hand, the construction 
of Otherness has followed a largely different pattern. In the case of 
Burma, the Other is represented not so much by outsiders, but by ethnic 
minorities who are expected to belong since their land of origin before 
independence was already located inside the boundaries of what now 
constitutes Burma, but have been resisting the state project of uniﬁcation 
and Burmanization, and more recently, of Myanmarization. In Burma, 
thus, Others are represented by the ethnic minorities from the frontier 
states, which include the Shan, the Karen, the Kayen, the Kachin, and 
the Mon, among others. Interestingly, however, multi-ethnicity is part 
of the ofﬁcial construction of Burmeseness. Otherness has been cre-
ated by the Burmese state based on its own design of multi-ethnicity. 
Burmeseness in other words is, in its own essence, a highly fragmented 
frame of identity, even if we take into consideration the momentary 
alliances and agreements at different points in time and between the 
different groups. It is important as well to mention that the Burmese 
junta points directly to the former colonial power, the British, as well 
as other outsiders, mostly Westerners, as representing the evil Others. 
However, in my perspective, this construction does not leave a strong 
imprint among educated Burmese in Thailand, especially among pro-
democracy activists who have found their strongest support among 
Westerners generally. 
Feelings of belonging and not belonging are intrinsically linked to a 
collection of subjective experiences about identity before and after mi-
gration, experiences that deﬁne where the migrants locate themselves 
in the world. These experiences are not limited to nationality, ethnicity 
or class modes of identiﬁcation, all of which bear different meanings 
and attributes according to context. In this respect, the politics of nam-
ing can be extremely confusing for the individuals who never had the 
opportunity to question who they were before changing their environ-
ments. Being Burmese in Thailand does not mean the same as being 
Burmese in Burma. One of the ways to escape the conﬂicting construc-
tions presented as operative in different contexts is to engage the self 
in an identity framework that borrows characteristics that transcend 
political and cultural geographies and at the same time produces alter-
native ways of engaging the collective. Many Burmese youth in Thai 
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universities start identifying with images of the suffering of the Burmese 
displayed in the media, which gives them the opportunity to appropriate 
these images in a backward motion. They listen to the news in English 
from exile media, interact regularly and listen to the political exiles - in 
some cases they are taught by them. They learn to relocate themselves 
in a transnational environment where their own subjective experiences 
are always taken into account. The image of the victim helps them to 
display their shared values with sometimes great motivation and fresh 
insights without falling into essentialist representations of who they are 
supposed to be. Victimhood takes them back to their own Burmeseness 
by adding dignity to their otherwise shattered voices.
Carole Faucher is currently Associate Professor of Anthropology in the 
Graduate Program of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of 
Tsukuba in Japan. (cfaucher@sakura.cc.tsukuba.ac.jp)
NOTES
1 This is a ﬁctitious name. Most of the respondents in this article have been given 
ﬁctitious names at their request, to remain anonymous. 
2 The name of the state was ofﬁcially changed from Burma to Myanmar in 1989 by 
the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). However, the name 'Myanmar' 
is not recognized by some Western governments nor by any pro-democracy Bur-
mese activists. In the international arena, both Myanmar and Burma are ofﬁcially 
recognized. My own choice of using Burma (unless in a citation) in this paper is es-
sentially because it was most commonly used by the Burmese migrants in Thailand 
involved in this research as well as by the Thai when they speak in English. It is also 
the term favoured by the English language newspapers in Bangkok such as The Na-
tion and the Bangkok Post. However, the younger generation of Burmese migrants, 
especially students, often use 'Myanmar' even when they are very vocal against the 
military regime ruling their homeland. Thus, both terms remain extremely divisive 
but the term Burma appeared to be generally less problematic among the Burmese 
I met in Thailand. The name of the former capital Rangoon was also changed, to 
Yangon, in 1989. Here I use Yangon, which I found more commonly used among 
my respondents.
3 The Irrawaddy is a news magazine conceived by Burmese political exiles and based 
in Chiang Mai, Thailand. 
4 The term 'urban migrants' is also commonly used (see for example, Taylor 2009). 
However, I prefer the term 'English-educated migrants' because 'urban migrants' 
refers mainly to political exiles and has been used widely in the context of student 
political dissidents ﬂeeing to Thailand in the 1990s. 
5 A large number of political exiles arrived in Thailand during the years following 
the event now known as 8-8-88, which refers to a bloody crackdown by the military 
on protests led on 8 August 1988 by university students against the then one-party 
system. The crackdown resulted in the death of more than 3,000 people, mostly uni-
versity students, and the military coup that put the SLORC in power. Subsequently, 
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the political exiles continued their political activities under the banner of organiza-
tions such as the All Myanmar Student's Democratic Front (ABSDF), the National 
Council of the Union of Myanmar (NCUB), and the National League for Democracy 
(Liberate Area). For a detailed analysis of Burmese pro-democracy activists abroad 
see Zaw Oo (2006).
6 SPDC refers to the State Peace and Development Council, the name of the Myanmar 
military government since 1997. SPDC replaced  SLORC, which stands for State Law 
and Order Restoration Council. The change of name coincided with an administra-
tive reorganization of the military structure. 
7 In the introduction of her book Living Silence in Myanmar, Christina Fink notes, 
'Some ethnic nationalist leaders worry that a democratic government would not 
safeguard minority rights. At the same time, some Burman pro-democracy activists 
are uncomfortable with the ethnic nationals' demands for autonomy, which they 
perceive as potentially leading to the break-up of the country. In recent years many 
of the opposition groups have to see the creation of a federal, democratic union as 
the best solution for all, but the regime's divide-and-rule tactics have made it dif-
ﬁcult for them to work together' (2009: 3).
8 Interview conducted in Chiang Mai, 20 August 2009.
9 The Saffron Revolution is the name that was given to the anti-government protests 
that took place between 18 and 30 September 2007 simultaneously in many cities 
of the country. The demonstrations ended following a series of brutal military 
crackdowns. Saffron is associated with the colour of the robes of the thousands of 
Buddhist monks who were leading the protests.
10 The Nation is one of the two major English language daily newspapers in Thailand. 
The other one is the Bangkok Post. 
11 The author is the one I refer to as Yin Soe, whom I quote at the beginning of this 
article. I thank her deeply for letting me quote this letter.
12  By December 1999, 2,905 students had registered and entered Maneeloy (Caouette 
and Pack 2002: 11).
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